Welcome to the second instalment of "part 2" in this series where i write about "the basics of philosophy by Nigel Warburton"
I part 1 we discussed questions surrounding the various versions of God.
In the first instalment of the part 2 about Ethics i discussed a few of the theories that define what may or may not be considered "Moral", or "Ethical" actions.
Here in the second instalment we take look at Meta Ethics. thats is the study of theories about those central theories, and applications of them
In his book Nigel looks at Naturalism, Relativism, and Emotivism. A brief discussion of these will bring into focus some of the things that the first order theories of duty, consequentialism and Virtue cannot fully explore.
Naturalism.
In essence a theory that postulates formations of value based ethical judgments following on from directly discoverable scientific facts. Born from utilitarianism, and a description of human nature, which leads to how we ought to behave. At it's core it presupposes a biological or naturally occurring reason for things to be as they are and moral judgements as to what to do about that knowledge follow from that.
Problems with naturalism.
How can one link facts to value based judgments? One does not directly lead to the other, in a relevant and quantitative sense, except via the method of opinion.
It may be a fact that I am fat for instance. Some might see that as inherent proof of my laziness, or perhaps a suggestion of an injury that precludes sufficient exercise. Both of these are born of opinion and do not directly link to the fact that i am fat.
So, ought we to make these judgments of fat people based on our own perceptions of them? David Hulme first raised this objection to naturalism by demonstrating that philosophers move, as i have done here, towards "what we ought to do" from "what is", without further discussion.
To link this to a real world question. Arguments as to the causality of trans gender, or homosexuality. Both exist in the realm of science. Or to put it another way, discoverable biological or physiological fact. The Naturalist would argue therefore that the value placed on homosexuality and or transgender issues does directly follow from thees arguments, where as the anti naturist would suggest further debate is needed.
It's kinda like the "I was born this way, therefore it's natural, therefore its ok" argument.
On the surface this seems fine. But what of other traits that we are born with? Aggression, intolerance, integrity, or lack thereof? Just because we are born with traits doesn't mean we "ought to" act on them. Thus the presence of scientific knowledge regarding causality and reasoning about how homosexuality, transgender or any other trait to exist will not tell us what to do about it.
Questions surrounding human nature also play into this argument. Since if Human nature is given too much credence then it presupposes a somewhat passenger like life for humans. It diminishes "free will" and thus our responsibility for our own actions. How far each of these opposing arguments, "human nature" and "free will" play into each other becomes a matter for debate as too much emphasis on human nature leads us to devolve ourselves from responsibility for our failings at the species level. Its an interesting question when one considers the field of anthropology. Looking at humans as animals, subject to the same evolutionary forces that others on this planet live under. Animals is discussed in the next chapter... so i'll revisit this.
Relativism.
Consider two areas of the world. Saudi Arabia and the UK. the laws in each country for the basis of their moral structure for ma societal POV. Yet one can be killed in Saudi, for committing an offence that in the UK would not even be considered so.
This is "moral relativism". The theory that different societies have differing views fright and wrong and thus an individuals perception of right and wrong is dependent on one's society. Which as we know is an accident of birth.
So..are ideas of "right" and "wrong" therefore definitive or subjective?
Consider the historical context as well as geographical. Years ago slavery was acceptable and not so long ago homosexuality was illegal in Britain. The case of Allan Turing, the father of modern computing and robotics remains a great moral question. His story was made into film, starring Benedict Cumberbatch, If you haven't seen "The imitation game" I heartily recommend it.
Two criticism of the relativism argument are firstly that "all morals are relative but relativism is true" which is almost animal farmesque in its complicit contradiction, and secondly that "what defines a society" is open to interpretation since it need not be a legal or country based definition.
This is highlighted by the case of Marine A. Sgt Blackman, killed a wounded Taliban fighter in Afghanistan and was subsequently tried and convicted of murder in a uk courts marshal. Recently the murder conviction was ruled unsafe on evidence of mental health considerations. The moral relativism here are that one can arguably say Soldiers or the military are their own society since they do have a different moral code to the average civilian, specifically to use the christian phrasing, "thou shall not kill".
The situational issues of where Sgt Blackman was also bear thought. It certainly wasn't what we in the peaceful west might call an "ordinary societal construct". Thus can we reasonably suggest that ordinary societal rules should apply? Then their are the legal issues. The relative legality of "when" the afghan man was shot, not whether. Arguably it wasn't murder that Sgt Blackman was convicted of, rather it was "unsanctioned" murder, by virtue of the legal change inherent over those few minutes. Had the afghan man died by virtue of an exchange of fire, he would still have been "murdered" in the philosophical sense of one human killing and other deliberately, but it would have been legal and therefore by extension relatively morally justified for the POV of UK forces. Though not so by the afghan side. There are many other arguments in the case of Sgt Blackman, but this gives a flavour of the contradictory and relative nature of morality and legality based on situation.
Emotivism
"homosexuality is wrong"
Torture wrong"
"telling a lie is wrong"
"going against gods will is wrong"
Emotivism would suggest all these statements above, which are ethical statements of position, are meaningless. That is to say that in and of themselves they give not facts, only opinions. And as such should be accorded the same level of legitimacy.
This it perhaps a weird one to get ones head around. exact when one asks the question "why" of any of these statements. In doing so and opening the debate we then move from statement of opinion into discussion of reason why, factual or conceptual arguments as to evidence or moral theory. Thus Whilst once can quite easily see that bare statements have limited intrinsic value, the value of exploration of these statements cannot be understated.
The major criticism of Emotivism is that it reduces significant and very weighty matters to mere triviality. If we simply decided that the statement "torture is wrong' was a matter of personal choice, it's not hard to see the consequences for society as whole.
So there you have it. Three "meta ethical"theories of what "right" and "wrong" might mean. Theories that lean on the 1st level descriptions of ethical thought and attempt to further define Societal Ethical questions. In a sense, one can think of the first order theories being concerned with the individual relating to the world, and the second order meta ethical ones taking a broader societal view. One of humans examining how we deal en mass with societal ethical questions rather than individual ones.
Of course theres over lap, and the boundaries are never clear, but hey, that's philosophy for ya...you want facts, try science! It's down the hall third door on the left!
Tata!
part three on applied ethical questions is found here!
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